










Abstract: This paper looks at the Peace Testimony of Quakers (the Religious Society of Friends) and 
argues that, although Quakerism is commonly seen as pacifist (in some sense of that term) by many 
both within and without the Society, the Peace Testimony is best seen as not pacifist. The paper 
argues that the Peace Testimony grows from the Society’s spirituality and its commitment to 
corporate spiritual guidance and witness, as such, it is not reconcilable with the ethical absolutism 
that is pacifism (as often defined). The Quaker commitment to social justice means that outcomes 
matter, human well-being is very important, and circumstances must be taken into account in 
determining policy and behaviour. The paper concludes that, at a time of great change in armed 






The Quakers (or Religious Society of Friends) are a denomination that came into 
being in England in the 1650s. Christian in origin, they were universalist in their 
approach to Christianity from their earliest years as can be seen in the Quaker 
theologian Robert Barclay’s writings about the true church: 
…There may be members therefore of this catholic Church both among 
Heathen, Turks [i.e. Muslims], Jews, and all the several sorts of Christians, 
men and women of integrity and simplicity of heart, who… being upright in 
their hearts before the Lord, chiefly aiming and labouring to be delivered 
from iniquity and loving to follow righteousness, are by the secret touches of 
this holy Light in their souls enlivened and quickened, thereby secretly united 
to God, and therethrough become true members of this catholic Church.1  
The Quakers seek to be spirit-led in their worship and ethics. ‘God is met in the 
gathered meeting and through the Spirit leads us into ways of life and 
understandings of truth which we recognise as Quaker,’ according to Quaker Faith 
and Practice, the anthology published by Britain Yearly Meeting that describes the 
practices and procedures of the Society in Britain.2 The Society has evolved social 
testimonies that capture elements of its understanding of truth and its way of life.3 
My focus is the Peace Testimony, perhaps the best-known of the Quaker social 
testimonies. What is the peace testimony of the Quakers? What is their stance on 
political violence?  
                                                 




Christian attitudes to political violence 
Given the importance of morality to Christianity and the nature of Christianity as a 
revealed faith, thinkers in the Christian tradition can be expected to take a moral 
approach to political violence. They will be concerned with the moral rights and 
wrongs of political violence and with fidelity to Christian revelation. What moral 
approaches to political violence exist? Those who study this area may develop 
concepts and labels to describe the possibilities. For example, John Yoder highlights 
five moral approaches to political violence.4  
A. Pacifism 
B. Just War 
C. Holy War  
D. Realism 
E. War of Honour 
 
A. Pacifism 
Pacifism is a moral approach to political violence that rejects violence in some form 
(maybe in all forms). Yoder’s first position can be immediately expanded to five to 
allow greater precision:  
1. Non-resistance to evil  
2. Passive resistance to evil  
3. Non-violent active resistance to evil  
4. Non-lethal violent resistance to evil  
5. Anti-war  
 
1. The strictest form of pacifism is a rejection of any form of resistance. Evil is 
not to be resisted in any way (passively or actively, coercively or non-
coercively, violently or non-violently). 
2. The next strictest form of pacifism permits only a passive resistance to evil. 
One does not comply with evil orders but one does not seek to avoid the 
consequences of that non-compliance.5  
3. Next is a pacifism that permits or requires a non-violent active resistance to 
evil. Evil is to be resisted but violent means may not be used. Only non-
violent coercive means (such as protests, boycotts, strikes, sanctions) are 
permitted.  
4. A weaker form of pacifism is one that permits or requires a resistance to evil 
that may include non-lethal violent means. Evil is to be resisted, coercion may 
be used, and violence may be used but life may not be taken. Destruction of 
property is permitted as is the use of non-lethal weapons and harmful 
techniques against people. 
5. The weakest form of pacifism (but still a position that we would commonly 
label as pacifist) is one that rules out war, sometimes called ‘anti-warrism’. 
Violence may be used, even lethal violence, but there is something about war 
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(the size or scope of the violence, perhaps, or the nature of the people killed) 
that rules out this particular form of lethal political violence.  
 
 
B. Just war 
The second of Yoder’s approaches to war is the Just War approach. It holds some use 
of force to be right. Yoder presents the Just War stance as a compromise position 
between pacifism and realism, sharing something in common with each. In common 
with pacifism, it holds that morality applies to affairs of state as to all areas of life. In 
common with realism it accepts that force cannot be banished from history. The aim 
of the Just War position is the use of force as an instrument of order, justice, and 
good in world affairs. It accepts that force is part of this world but seeks to direct and 
limit it and to use it a route to relative good. To this end, the Just War approach 
forwards a set of restrictions on the resort to and the use of force, limiting when 
force may be used, for what ends, and the manner in which it may be used. Any set 
of rules or guidelines can be applied strictly, moderately or permissively and so 
Yoder’s Just War position can be expanded to encompass three approaches:  
6. Just War (strict) 
7. Just War (moderate) 
8. Just War (permissive) 
A strict Just War approach applies the criteria of a Just War strictly and limits the 
ruler’s freedom to wage war. Many uses of force are ruled out as unjust. The strict 
Just War position can merge into pacifism. The principles of a just war can be 
applied so strictly that they become prohibitively strict: all wars are found to be 
unjust. At the other extreme is a permissive Just War approach which applies the 
principles of Just War in a manner that gives great freedom to wage war. This 
permissive Just War position can be close to (and even merge into) Holy War or an 
amoral realism. The jus ad bellum requirement of ‘proper authority’ limits the resort 
to force to those in positions of leadership. However, if immense leeway is given to 
the political leader to determine just cause, ad bellum or strategic proportionality, last 
resort, etc., then really the leader’s freedom to wage war in the national interest is 
not restrained at all.  
 
C. Holy War (or Crusade) 
Yoder uses the terms Holy War or Crusade to denote more than a war declared by 
the church authorities, such as the crusade proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 to 
claim Jerusalem from Muslim control. Holy War, to Yoder, is a moral approach to 
war that rejects the presumption in favour of peace that is a key to the Just War 
approach. It is war in a ‘holy cause’ rather than a ‘just cause’. The Just War 
approach’s presumption for peace requires a trigger of injustice to override it. The 
Just War is a response to a wrong done and the just cause is the stopping or undoing 
of the injustice committed by the other party. Whereas the Just War looks to the past 
(it is a response to an injustice committed), the Holy War looks to the future (the 
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good outcome that will be achieved). The Holy War approach requires no trigger 
such as an assault or breach of rights by the other party as it sees a good end as 
sufficient reason to go to war. The ‘holy cause’ can be non-religious and the good 
ends could be of any type: maintenance of the rule of law, personal freedoms, free 
markets, regime change, access to oil, or the imposition of democracy. There is no 
presumption for peace and no trigger of past wrong is needed. Religious ideologies 
may prompt Holy Wars or Crusades but so too may non-religious ideologies such as 
Communism, Fascism, romantic nationalism or neo-liberalism. If the supposed just 
cause of a ‘just war’ is no more than a pretext, then the conflict may be akin to a Holy 
War or Crusade than a Just War.  
 
D. Amoral realism  
Yoder’s fourth approach to morality and the state use of force is one that holds that 
morality does not apply to this issue. States may resort to war for any reason or to 
further their national interest in any way. Perhaps ideas of moral rightness and 
wrongness do not apply to war or perhaps they do not apply to any affairs of states.  
 
E. War of Honour 
Yoder’s fifth and final moral approach to war, one he terms War of Honour, is one in 
which no end, moral or non-moral, is required because violent means are held to be 
not in need of justification. It is good to use violence to get things done, to assert 
yourself, to prove yourself. It is admirable to engage in a contest and win. It is 
honourable to seek conquest, triumph and domination. We go to war because we 
like war.  
 
In this way, drawing on work by Yoder, it is possible to conceptually distinguish 
eleven positions on war (five of which would be termed pacifist, and three Just War): 
• Non-resistance to evil (any resistance is wrong) 
• Passive resistance to evil (only non-coercive resistance is permitted) 
• Non-violent active resistance to evil (only non-violent coercion is permitted) 
• Non-lethal violent resistance to evil (violent resistance permitted but not killing)  
• Anti-war (lethal resistance is permitted but not war) 
• Just War (strict) 
• Just War (moderate) 
• Just War (permissive) 
• Holy War (or Crusade) 
• Realism 
• War of Honour 
 
Quaker attitudes to political violence 
Which of these positions best describe the Quaker peace testimony? Perhaps none of 
these should describe it if the Quaker peace testimony is to be spirit-led. The Quaker 
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openness to spiritual leading affects how they perceive elements of Christian 
revelation such as the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount. There are not Biblical 
literalists. They seek to abide by the spirit and not the letter. This interpretation of 
Christianity greatly influences their ethics. The famous words of the elders at Balby 
must apply to the Quaker peace testimony: 
Dearly beloved Friends, these things we do not lay upon you as a rule or form 
to walk by; but that all, with a measure of the light, which is pure and holy, 
may be guided: and so in the light walking and abiding, these things may be 
fulfilled in the Spirit, not in the letter, for the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth 
life.6 
 
Nevertheless the temptations for Quakers to describe their peace testimony as 
pacifist are many. It gives a social and self-identity to the Quakers. A group can be 
seen by outsiders in terms of how it differs from other groups; that social identity 
can then become part of the group’s self-identity. In religious groups a feature that is 
not a core belief (it may even be something minor like distinctive dress or avoidance 
of a particular food or drink) can come to be important in how non-members see the 
religious group and can then become more important to how members see their own 
group. They may become more attached to (or interpret more strictly) a feature that 
is part of their social identity and distinctiveness. Interpreting their peace testimony 
as pacifist may also help to maintain unity in their group as Quakers are more likely 
to agree on their social testimonies than on theology. Pacifism can be wrongly 
passed off as a religious principle and can also be wrongly offered as a policy 
prescription for every situation. The attractions of speaking on policy issues as a 
pacifist are clear. One has a firmly held policy position for every occasion and speaks 
immediately.  However these temptations are to be resisted if Quakers wish to be 
spirit-led and not letter-bound. If they wish to avoid dogma in the Peace Testimony 
as elsewhere, then no designation as rigid as pacifism should be applied to it.  
 
Augustine & Tolstoy 
It is good that Quakers seek to be led by the spirit and not by the letter because 
abiding by the letter is not straightforward as shown by two Christian thinkers who 
attach great importance to the recorded words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount: 
You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’  But I tell 
you, do not resist (or resist violently) an evil person. If anyone slaps you on 
the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also. And if anyone wants to sue 
you and take your cloak, hand over your tunic as well. If anyone forces you to 
go one mile, go with them two miles.7  
The first is St Augustine. There are two aspects to Augustine’s treatment of the 
counsel of Jesus to ‘resist not an evil person’ and to ‘turn the other cheek’. First, he 




If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare, because in after times it 
was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, ‘I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but 
if any one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left also,’ the answer 
is, that what is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward 
disposition.8  
Second, when he does treat the counsel of Jesus as pertaining to actions, he treats it 
consequentially. Augustine assesses ‘resisting not evil’ and ‘turning the other cheek’ 
as means to an end. From the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, Augustine 
deduces the end that Jesus wished to achieve, namely, ‘that the evil which is in the 
wicked man may be overcome by good’.9 Clear as to the end which Jesus valued 
when he told his listeners to ‘turn the other cheek’, Augustine can look at other 
means to that end and assess the likely efficacy. If it overcomes evil, then ‘turning 
the other cheek’ is indeed the best means (‘it is a higher glory still to stay war itself 
with a word, than to slay men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by 
peace, not by war‘, says Augustine10).  However if ‘turning the other cheek’ seems 
unlikely to overcome evil then Augustine considers other courses of action to 
achieve the desired end including violent ones as failure to act effectively means that 
‘the evil disposition, like an enemy within the man, is strengthened.’11  
 
Important to Augustine’s consequentialist calculus of the best means to the desired 
end is the weighting of good and bad outcomes. He attaches great importance to the 
morally good and bad and much less weight to the human good and bad. Motive is 
more important than outcome as death to Augustine is merely a human bad: 
What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, 
that others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not 
any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful 
cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, 
and such like....12  
Augustine’s consequentialist approach to the words of Jesus in the Sermon on the 
Mount leads him to advocate action that is the very opposite of turning the other 
cheek. His consequentialist interpretation of Christian ethics results in advocacy for 
non-pacifist action, indeed, for quite violent and oppressive action. Love of 
neighbour, to Augustine, is mostly about helping to repress the evil in them even 
when they do not wish the evil to be repressed and lethal violence may be used to 
this end when it offers the most effective route to repression.  
 
An alternative to Augustine’s consequentialist approach to the words of Jesus in the 
Sermon on the Mount is to make ‘turn the other cheek’ into an absolute rule about 
behaviour regardless of outcomes. One who took this approach was Leo Tolstoy 
who wrote: 
The text that gave me the key to the truth was the 39th verse of the fifth 
chapter of St. Matthew: ‘Ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an 
eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you that ye resist not evil.’ The simple 
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meaning of these words suddenly flashed full upon me; I accepted the fact 
that Christ meant exactly what he said and then, though I had found nothing 
new, all that had hitherto obscured the truth cleared away, and the truth itself 
arose before me in all its solemn importance.13 
To Tolstoy, Jesus’s command is to be taken literally and it prevails over all else. He 
dismissed any consideration of the consequences of our actions. With alarming 
consistency, Tolstoy works out the consequences of acquiescing, non-resisting love. 
He does this so starkly that it seems like a reductio ad absurdum of his interpretation 
of the Christian message but it is Tolstoy’s earnest interpretation of it.14  
 
Tolstoy shows the attractiveness of firm adherence to a few principles. Against 
Tolstoy’s approach is that he seems to be putting a rule (or his own fidelity to the 
rule or his own moral well-being) above that of the other person. To abide by a rule 
of action regardless of the effect on the other person may reveal a greater concern for 
one’s own moral status than for the well-being of the other. To act in a certain way 
whether or not any good comes of it for others, to act in a certain way even if great 
harm comes of it for others, to act in a certain way while refusing to even consider 
the good or harm that comes to others, hardly seems to be motivated by a love of 
one’s neighbour. The love of neighbour must take into considerations outcomes and 
not only intentions. Love of neighbour is not love of a rule, love of particular means, 
or love of a law, or love of one's own moral purity or exemplary behaviour. It is love 
of a person in their circumstances.  
 
Tolstoy also shows the practical problem with a literal interpretation. Although he 
uses the term ‘non-resistance’ to describe his stance (and wishes to remain absolutely 
faithful to Jesus’ teaching), he in fact practised non-violent resistance. Tolstoy could 
not stop speaking the truth as he saw it. He could not put down his pen but wrote 
political protests at the harsh treatment of prisoners, peasants and pacifists. Indeed 
he campaigned to improve the education of children and to end the persecution of 
Christian sectarians in Russia. The legal position and the administrative treatment of 
the sects in Russia certainly amounted to persecution, and Tolstoy’s attempts to 
ameliorate their position constituted non-violent resistance to it. Tolstoy’s 
interpretation of ‘resist not evil’ as non-violence may seem questionable but so too 
does the interpretation of ‘resist not evil’ as a passive non-resistance that seeks no 
ends. Surely one ought to tell another that his act will cause harm (he may not know 
that it will) and one ought to tell him the extent of the harm (even if he wishes to 
harm, the effects may be more serious or far-reaching than he thinks).  
 
Standing of the Quaker Peace Testimony 
That the Quaker peace testimony is to be spirit-led and not letter-bound suggests 
that it may avoid some issues faced by Augustine and Tolstoy. But what then is the 
standing of the Quaker peace testimony? With what authority do they Quaker claim 
to speak about political violence? Can they be wrong? Do they accept that others 
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could start from the same Quakerly values and concerns and reach different 
conclusions about nuclear weapons? Some answers can be found by comparing a 
Quaker statement on nuclear weapons from the 1980s to a Catholic one. 
 
In the 1980s, at the height of popular Western fears about the nuclear strategies of 
the Cold War adversaries, two statements on nuclear deterrence were released. In 
1983, the Catholic bishops in the USA published a pastoral letter on war and peace, 
The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response.15 It was a tumultuous time in 
US foreign policy, with the breakdown of SALT 2 negotiations between the 
superpowers, heightened American hostility towards the USSR (dubbed the ‘evil 
empire’ by President Reagan) and the deployment of destabilising weaponry. The 
starting point for the Bishops letter on political violence (like all Catholic teaching on 
social policy) is God and the dignity of the human person. The Creation story is used 
to assert the sacredness and dignity of human life and the equal worth of all human 
beings regardless of nationality or political system.16 Before their near total rejection 
of nuclear deterrence and nuclear use, the Bishops address the authority with which 
their make their judgment. The Bishops distinguish two purposes for the Church’s 
teachings on war, two audiences for their letter, and two levels of authority with 
which they write. One purpose is to help Catholics form their consciences; the other 
is to influence the public policy debate in society at large. One audience for the letter 
shares the bishops' faith; the other does not.17 The Bishops claim greater authority for 
their pronouncements on Catholic teaching and moral principles than for their 
guidance on defence policy options.18 As Aquinas had pointed out, policy requires 
political skills which the church lacks. The bishops accept that policy is a matter of 
prudence as well as principle and that people with the same morality can reach 
different conclusions on issues of policy. Their endorsement of nuclear no-first-use 
was a prudential judgement and not binding on members of the Church in the USA. 
Good Catholics could disagree with the Bishop and still see a place for nuclear 
weapons in US defence policy.  
 
What about the Quakers? Instead of revelation, scripture and priestly expertise, they 
rely on corporate spiritual leading. Are they spiritually guided on policy positions as 
well as on fundamental norms? Can Quakers be wrong? Are non-Quaker positions 
wrong? In 1987, as the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control 
Act was passed into law, the Yearly Meeting of Quakers in New Zealand issued a 
Peace Statement in support.19 Like the Catholics, the Quakers start their statement on 
political violence from an assertion of the worth and dignity of the human being: 
‘there is that of God in every one which makes each person too precious to damage 
or destroy’. On the basis of an ‘affirmation of life and the destiny of humankind’, it 
calls on the New Zealand public to ‘reject the clamour of fear and listen to the 
whisperings of hope’ and to oppose ‘all wars, all preparation for war, all use of 
weapons and coercion by force, and all military alliances’.20 The Quaker statement is 
less detailed (the Bishops’ letter is over fifty pages long and was issued after two 
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years of deliberations; the Quaker statement is one page long). The Quaker 
statement also directly connects a fundamental value of human worth to a particular 
policy position. Whereas the Catholic Bishops addressed both Catholics and non-
Catholics, the Quaker statement addresses the public with a statement on which, it 
says of Quakers, ‘we all agree as one’. The New Zealand Quakers do ‘acknowledge 
that we ourselves are as limited and as erring as anyone else’ and they allow that 
they ‘do not have a blueprint for peace that spells out every stepping stone towards 
the goal that we share. In any particular situation, a variety of personal decisions 
could be made with integrity’. In contrast to the US episcopal letter, the New 
Zealand statement throws little light on the process by which a religious group 
connects its normative commitments and eschatological convictions to 
considerations of political violence.  
  
A time of change in war/peace 
The issue of nuclear weapons in the 1980s may have allowed the appearance of a 
direct connection from fundamental values to a policy position but the issues we 
face now require an approach that is less simple. One issue concerns the rule against 
targeting civilians, which was the central focus of post-1945 endeavours to restrain 
war.21 The rule has passed into customary international humanitarian law and has 
been authoritatively stated as follows:  
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian 
objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military 
objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.22  
The rules are not eternal verities. They are of instrumental value23. They serve 
human beings by guiding international society towards its good ends. All rules go 
out of date. Reality changes and they become inoperable or they no longer serve 
their end. The rule against targeting civilians is now under immense pressure at this 
time of great change in armed conflict. For political, cultural, and technological 
reasons, the category of the civilian is now under great stress and so too is the 
structure of power and ideas that gave rise to its prominence in law and custom. The 
status of the civilian is collapsing because of the changing nature of warfare, the 
practical and conceptual difficulties in differentiating civilian from combatant now, 
and the end of the world order that gave protected status to the civilian in law. The 
challenges to the civilians rule are many: 
 
1. Militarization of foreign policy 
a) weakening of the war/peace distinction  
b) expansion of the concept of war 
c) militarization of foreign policy 
 
2. Combatancy 
a) a humanisation of the combatant  
b) novel combatants: drone operators 
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c) novel combatants: private security contractors 
d) novel combatants: cyberwar and fifth-dimension operations 
 
3. Targeting 
a) novel targets: assassination 
b) novel targets: ‘signature strikes’ 
c) novel targets: cyberwar and fifth-dimension operations 
 
4. Context 
a) decreased respect for the civilian population  
b) decreased respect for the rules of IHL 
c) decreased respect for the ethics of war  




1. War/peace distinction 
There has been an expansion of the concept of war, a militarization of foreign policy 
and a weakening of the war/peace distinction that have damaged the rule against 
targeting civilians. The blurring of the war/peace distinction started when the attacks 
of 9/11 were described not as a crime but as an act of war and the response to it was 
described as a war rather than as a criminal investigation seeking to culminate in 
apprehension and prosecution.24 The War on Terror blurred definitions of war and 
peace as it was waged on a global battlefield with no front lines, vague boundaries of 
conflict, no beginning or end to hostilities and a confusion of combatant and non-
combatant. Mikhail Gorbachev talks starkly of the ‘militarisation of politics’.25   
 
2. Combatancy 
A second change concerns combatants. In its War on Terror, the USA has faced an 
adversary of unconventional combatants who do not wear uniform or insignia, who 
hide among the civilian population and who may locate combatant personnel and 
assets in civilian facilities including schools and hospitals. The state party to this 
armed conflict has also blurred the combatant/civilian distinction through a 
humanisation of the combatant that undercuts the status of the civilian, and through 
its use of drones and private security contractors. Private military contractors blur 
the combatants/civilians distinction by being neither one nor the other. Drone  
operators are another novel combatant. In the USA agencies other than the armed 
forces have conducted lethal operations with weaponized drones. The USAF has 
carried out lethal drone operations but so too has the CIA with Predators piloted by 
civilians, both intelligence officers and private contractors (sometimes military and 
intelligence retirees).26 Cyberwar and fifth-dimension operations are carried out by 





The War on Terror has seen a new approach to the delineation of targets. The 
precision of drones and special forces on the ground have allowed violence to be 
focused so that it is akin to assassination. The Obama Administration has drawn up 
‘kill lists’ of people they believe represent threats to the USA. With no defined 
battlefield, these high-value targets have been killed wherever they are found. 
Assassinations have included US citizens. Drone technology allows the targeting of 
people who are not engaged in hostilities at that time or posing an imminent threat 
and who are not in a country where the drone user is at war. With drones, 
assassination has become a tool of foreign and security policy. 
 
4. Context 
In all, however, the conclusion must be that the blurring of the combatant/civilian 
distinction has too many facets and causes for it to be reversed. Furthermore the 
protected status of the civilian was a product of a post-1945 liberal world order that 
is now fragmenting in the face of relative decline and democratic disillusionment. 
Now many of the countries that took the lead in creating this liberal world order 
have turned against it, both in government policy and popular support. Conflicts in 
the near future are less likely to be regulated by a set of global rules as the nature of 
conflict has changed, as authority at the global level is weaker, and as both states 
and non-state groups are less susceptible to global pressure.  
 
Time of change 
The demise of the rule against targeting civilians means that we must seek now new 
methods to reduce the harm done by armed conflict. New rules will emerge 
although, until those rules emerge, little more than considerations of proportionality 
may determine the use of violence for political ends. With no longer any distinction 
between civilians and combatants, a fundamentally different idea of proportionality 
will operate in war. Proportionality calculations will become complex when civilians 
can be sacrificed to save combatants. They will also be difficult to make in 
asymmetric and multi-lateral armed conflicts. The most important issue will be 
whether value is attached to the lives of adversaries.27 As the pace of change in 
warfare slows, new ideas about restraint in war will merge based on experience. 
They may struggle to gain the status of rules of international humanitarian law in an 
era of rejection of universal norms and global governance and vigorous assertions of 
national and religious distinctiveness. Nonetheless the cause of compassion in 
warfare must be promoted as well as the commitment to acknowledge the humanity 
of all in war, both the perpetrators of violence and its victims. Each group may bring 
its own ethics to armed conflict but each must be challenged to account for its resort 
to violence and its targeting choices. 
 
At this time of change and uncertainty, Quakers can usefully offer, not a peace 
testimony interpreted as a rigid ethical absolutism, but an engagement to most 
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effectively restrain massacre and build the laws and rules of international society. 
We need an approach that is not bound to the letter but seeks the spirit behind it. 
The Quakers can bring much to this. Their truth testimony can be important as we 
enquire about the good sought and the harm that is likely, the chances and risks, the 
real motivation for the use of political violence. Their equality testimony can be 
important as a key issue in a proportionality calculation is the value given to the 
lives of adversaries. At this time of heightened risk of unrestrained warfare, Quakers 
can work with others to increase human dignity, to decrease human suffering, to 
maintain hope and persevere, to acknowledge the humanity of all, and to be creative 
in seeking enduring solutions. 
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